Constitutional political economy applies an economic approach to the analysis of constitutional choice. Initially, research clearly leaned towards legitimizing the state and its actions. However, the transitions taking place in Central and Eastern Europe have made apparent the necessity to improve our knowledge of the working properties of alternative constitutional rules, thus stressing the importance of positive analysis. The authors analyse both the opportunities and dangers of importing constitutions from around the world into this area. The papers assembled in this volume deal with the question of what individual transition processes have taught us in terms of constitution-building. The book contains analyses of post 1989 constitutional developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe from the perspectives of varied disciplines; including academics, politicians and the judiciary. Constitutions, Markets and Law will be welcomed by scholars of transition studies and political economists as well as practitioners of, and academics with an interest in, constitutional law.

Self-contained chapters on the most important applications and methodologies in finance, which can easily be used for the reader’s research or as a reference for courses on empirical finance. Each chapter is reproducible in the sense that the reader can replicate every single figure, table, or number by simply copy-pasting the code we provide. A full-fledged introduction to machine learning with tidymodels based on tidy principles to show how factor selection and option pricing can benefit from Machine Learning methods. Chapter 2 on accessing & managing financial data shows how to retrieve and prepare the most important datasets in the field of financial economics: CRSP and Compustat. The chapter also contains detailed explanations of the most important data characteristics. Each chapter provides exercises that are based on established lectures and exercise classes and which are designed to help students to dig deeper. The exercises can be used for self-studying or as source of inspiration for teaching exercises.

Self-contained chapters on the most important applications and methodologies in finance, which can easily be used for the reader’s research or as a reference for courses on empirical finance. Each chapter is reproducible in the sense that the reader can replicate every single figure, table, or number by simply copy-pasting the code we provide. A full-fledged introduction to machine learning with tidymodels based on tidy principles to show how factor selection and option pricing can benefit from Machine Learning methods. Chapter 2 on accessing & managing financial data shows how to retrieve and prepare the most important datasets in the field of financial economics: CRSP and Compustat. The chapter also contains detailed explanations of the most important data characteristics. Each chapter provides exercises that are based on established lectures and exercise classes and which are designed to help students to dig deeper. The exercises can be used for self-studying or as source of inspiration for teaching exercises.

This book aims to extend the current research and debate in constitutional economics by using a positive economics approach. Born out of discontent with the current state in constitutional economics, this book presents an inquiry in the possibilities of a positive constitutional economics, and how societies choose their constitutional rules.Drawing on economics, the book examines the emergence of constitutions and how and why they change over time. The author proposes that model constitutions are based on, and backed by institutions which have developed spontaneously. He presents some predictions on the scope of constitutional change under various constitutional settings and factors which cause constitutional change. Stefan Voigt concludes that constitutional change is reconceptualized as the outcome of a bargaining game, in which changes reflect the altered bargaining power of the actors. This book will be welcomed by academics working in the fields of political economy, law and economics as well as those from the public choice and new institutional schools of thought.

This authoritative new collection includes the most important published articles on the normative and positive branches of constitutional political economy. It contains sections on the ideas and concepts of constitutions, on the process of creating and amending them, a variety of papers on both the horizontal as well as the vertical separation of powers, and a final section on the relevance of constitutions for economic outcomes. The editor has written an authoritative introduction which contains a broad bibliography on all aspects of constitutional political economy. This two-volume set will be especially welcome in the field of constitutional political economy since it is a research area which crosses traditional disciplinary boundaries. It will be useful to those teaching a course in constitutional political economy as well as economists, political scientists, legal scholars, and political philosophers doing research in this area.

Why is it that some countries become rich while others remain poor? Do markets require regulation to function efficiently? If markets offer an efficient way of exchanging goods, why do individuals even create firms? How are economic transactions organized in the absence of a state that could enforce contracts and guarantee property rights? Institutional economics has allowed social scientists to answer many fundamental questions about the organization and functioning of societies. This introduction to institutional economics is concise, yet easy to understand. It not only caters to students of economics but to anybody interested in this topical research area and its specific subfields. Both formal and informal institutions (such as customs, habits, and traditions) are discussed with respect to their causes and consequences, highlighting the important part they play for economic growth and development.

Constitutional political economy has emerged as an indispensable part of political economy. This book offers a concise survey of the questions, methods, and empirical findings central to this topic. What effects - if any - do constitutions have within autocracies? Can small electoral districts help reduce corruption? Does a country's leadership affect the size of its government? Can direct democratic institutions increase politicians' accountability to citizens? Stefan Voigt, a pioneer in the field, explores these questions and more throughout the course of this cutting-edge primer. As the number of courses in constitutional economics continues to grow, this book fills an important gap in the literature. This highly original project maintains curiosity about the questions it generates, identifying potential new areas of research whilst successfully demonstrating the impact constitutional rules have on political economy.

Why is it that some countries become rich while others remain poor? Do markets require regulation to function efficiently? If markets offer an efficient way of exchanging goods, why do individuals even create firms? How are economic transactions organized in the absence of a state that could enforce contracts and guarantee property rights? Institutional economics has allowed social scientists to answer many fundamental questions about the organization and functioning of societies. This introduction to institutional economics is concise, yet easy to understand. It not only caters to students of economics but to anybody interested in this topical research area and its specific subfields. Both formal and informal institutions (such as customs, habits, and traditions) are discussed with respect to their causes and consequences, highlighting the important part they play for economic growth and development.

Constitutional political economy has emerged as an indispensable part of political economy. This book offers a concise survey of the questions, methods, and empirical findings central to this topic. What effects - if any - do constitutions have within autocracies? Can small electoral districts help reduce corruption? Does a country's leadership affect the size of its government? Can direct democratic institutions increase politicians' accountability to citizens? Stefan Voigt, a pioneer in the field, explores these questions and more throughout the course of this cutting-edge primer. As the number of courses in constitutional economics continues to grow, this book fills an important gap in the literature. This highly original project maintains curiosity about the questions it generates, identifying potential new areas of research whilst successfully demonstrating the impact constitutional rules have on political economy.

Almost anywhere in the world, new constitutions are written and passed at almost any time. Over the last couple of years, an increasing number of economists have analysed constitutions based on an economic approach with an emphasis firstly on the (economic) effects of constitutions and followed by the factors determining their content. The contributions assembled in this volume go one step further: they ask how the knowledge gained over the last number of years can usefully be applied to constitutional design. This new branch could also be termed applied constitutional economics. Along with an original introduction, Professor Voigt has compiled a valuable research collection that will be of interest to scholars and practitioners in this growing field.

Making European Merger Policy More Predictable analyses European Merger Control with regard to its capacity to generate predictability among the concerned parties. Starting from the premise that predictability is of overwhelming importance for the functioning of market economies, Voigt and Schmidt ask to what degree European Merger Control has been predictable over the last couple of years. The authors show both theoretically and empirically that there have been serious shortcomings with regard to the predictability of competition policy. They identify the insufficient recognition of the consequences of globalization on the competitive processes as well as an often inconsistent application of economic theory as the root causes for the lack of predictability. The inconsistent application of economic theory is particularly relevant with regard to potential competition and the evaluation of collective dominance. The authors generate a substantial number of proposals that could help to improve predictability. On this basis, Voigt and Schmidt critically assess the recent reforms of European Merger Control.

Making European Merger Policy More Predictable analyses European Merger Control with regard to its capacity to generate predictability among the concerned parties. Starting from the premise that predictability is of overwhelming importance for the functioning of market economies, Voigt and Schmidt ask to what degree European Merger Control has been predictable over the last couple of years. The authors show both theoretically and empirically that there have been serious shortcomings with regard to the predictability of competition policy. They identify the insufficient recognition of the consequences of globalization on the competitive processes as well as an often inconsistent application of economic theory as the root causes for the lack of predictability. The inconsistent application of economic theory is particularly relevant with regard to potential competition and the evaluation of collective dominance. The authors generate a substantial number of proposals that could help to improve predictability. On this basis, Voigt and Schmidt critically assess the recent reforms of European Merger Control.

The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the research in economics, political science, law, and sociology that has generated considerable insight into the politics of democratic and authoritarian systems as well as the influence of different institutional frameworks on incentives and outcomes. The result is an improved understanding of public policy, public finance, industrial organization, and macroeconomics as the combination of political and economic analysis shed light on how various interests compete both within a given rules of the games and, at times, to change the rules. These volumes include analytical surveys, syntheses, and general overviews of the many subfields of public choice focusing on interesting, important, and at times contentious issues. Throughout the focus is on enhancing understanding how political and economic systems act and interact, and how they might be improved. Both volumes combine methodological analysis with substantive overviews of key topics. This first volume covers voting and elections; interest group competition and rent seeking, including corruption and various normative approaches to evaluating policies and politics. Throughout both volumes important analytical concepts and tools are discussed, including their application to substantive topics. Readers will gain increased understanding of rational choice and its implications for collective action; various explanations of voting, including economic and expressive; the role of taxation and finance in government dynamics; how trust and persuasion influence political outcomes; and how revolution, coups, and authoritarianism can be explained by the same set of analytical tools as enhance understanding of the various forms of democracy.